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NOTE 
JUST ANOTHER KID WITH A GUN? 
UNITED STATES v. MICHAEL R.: 
REVIEWING THE YOUTH 
HANDGUN SAFETY ACT UNDER 
THE UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 
COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, for the first time in nearly sixty years, the United 
States Supreme Court struck down a federal statute as falling 
outside the proper scope of the Commerce Clause.1 In United 
States v. Lopez,2 the Court attempted to define a limit on the 
commerce power within the structure of federalism.3 Rejecting 
the "near plenary power" Congress had exercised under the 
Commerce Clause since 1937,4 the Court maintained that the 
enumeration of the federal powers in the Constitution pre-
sumes that some powers must remain under the exclusive con-
trol of the states.5 After articulating a new commercial-activity 
1. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995). 
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
3. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
4. See Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and 
Other Cases, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 526 (1997). 
5. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568. 
51 
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element in its Commerce Clause review,6 the Court held that 
the law challenged in Lopez was not concerned with commer-
cial activity and, therefore, was beyond the scope of the com-
merce power.7 
The Lopez decision prompted many defendants, charged un-
der a wide variety of federal statutes, to attack those statutes 
as unconstitutional under the new "commercial activity" test.8 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed one such challenge in United States v. Michael R.9 
Section II of this note discusses Michael R. 's facts and proce-
dural history. Section III outlines the history of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, with an emphasis on the recent change 
in the Supreme Court's review of Congress' use of the com-
merce power under Lopez. In addition, Section III details the 
legislative history of the Youth Handgun Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(x), the law under which Michael R. was prosecuted and 
which Congress intended to be an exercise of the commerce 
power. Section IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in 
Michael R. Section V critiques this reasoning in light of the 
Supreme Court's holding in Lopez, and prior Commerce Clause 
history, and fmds that Michael R. further substantiates the 
theory that the judiciary is not the branch of government that 
should define the limits of federalism. Finally, Section VI con-
cludes that despite its initial fanfare as either revolutionary or 
reactionary, subsequent cases, such as Michael R., indicate 
that Lopez does not represent a new era of Commerce Clause 
review. 
6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United 
States u. Lopez, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 793, 813 (1996). 
7. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
8. See United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1995). These challenges 
were usually unsuccessful. See id. For an extensive discussion of post-Lopez chal-
lenges, see United States u. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444 (6th Cir. 1996). Both the majority 
opinion and Judge Boggs' opinion include comprehensive lists of the lower court chal-
lenges. Judge Boggs' opinion catalogs these cases with incredible thoroughness: "The 
cases given ... do not include every case where Lopez was cited, only those cases where 
the Lopez issue was material to the outcome of the case or the case contained strong 
dicta suggesting the relevant court's view of the constitutionality of the statute at is-
sue." Wall, 92 F.3d at 1485 n.64. 
9. 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (per Ezra, J., sitting by designation; joined by Pre-
gerson & Trott, JJ.). 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MICHAEL R. 
On June 23, 1995, police officer Clayton Alan Kidd was on 
plainclothes patrol, in an unmarked police vehicle, in a high 
crime area of Tucson, Arizona.10 Officer Kidd was part of an 
anti·gang activity team.H Around 10:30 p.m., Kidd saw a 
pickup truck, containing two occupants, driving towards him.12 
The occupants had features and demeanors that made Kidd 
suspect they might be gang members.13 The two people in the 
truck were "mad·dogging" Kidd, an activity that is often a prel· 
ude to gang violence.14 Kidd drove away and the pickup truck 
followed him, at one point attempting to pass him on a residen· 
tial street.15 Eventually, officers in two marked vehicles 
stopped the pickup truck.16 
At the time of the stop, three individuals who had been ly· 
ing down in the back of the truck, including the defendant, Mi· 
chael R., sat up.17 The officers then ordered everyone out of the 
truck. IS As Michael R. got out, the officers heard something 
metallic hit the pavement.19 Upon finding a small .22 caliber 
pistol on the ground near Michael R., the officers promptly ar· 
rested him.20 
The United States Attorney's Office filed an information 
charging Michael R. under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency 
Act21 for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), juvenile in posses· 
10. See United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1996). 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. at 342-43. The court only mentions that "Kidd noticed that they were 
Hispanic males with very short, almost shaven hair." Id. 
14. See id. at 343. The court described "mad-dogging" as looking at someone with 
a "stem expression." Id. 
15. See Michael R., 80 F .3d at 343. 
16. See id. 
17. Seeid. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 343. 
21. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA> of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-415, §§ 101-545, 88 Stat. 1109, 1109-43 (1974) (as amended by the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act (CCCA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit II, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031- 5042». The JJDPA and the CCCA modernized the Fed-
eral Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-666, §§ 1-9, 52 Stat. 764, 764-66 
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sion of a handgun.22 At the juvenile proceedings, Michael R. 
challenged admission of the gun, claiming that it was the fruit 
of an unconstitutional search.23 He also challenged the consti-
tutionality of § 922(x)(2), arguing that federal regulation of ju-
venile handgun possession was unconstitutional because it ex-
ceeded Congress' commerce power.24 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress the gun, 
holding that the police had a legitimate basis for stopping the 
truck.25 The court also denied the challenge to the statute, 
finding that regulating juvenile handgun possession was 
(1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042), which had remained nearly 
unaltered since 1938. See William S. Sessions & Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the 
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 14 ST. MARy's L. J. 509, 509 (1983). Under the new 
juvenile delinquency laws, a person under the age of 18 who commits an act that would 
be a federal crime if committed by an adult commits an act of juvenile delinquency. See 
18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994). The charge does not involve an offense, per se, but rather 
addresses the defendant's status as a juvenile delinquent. See Sessions & Bracey, 
supra, at 510. The Act embodies Congress' preference for resolution in state, rather 
than federal, courts. See Annotation, Treatment of Juvenile Alleged to Have Violated 
Law of United States Under Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (18 U.S.C.A §§ 5031· 
5042), 58 AL.R. FED. 232, 236 (1982). Before a federal delinquency proceeding can 
begin, the U.S. Attorney must certify that either: "(1) a juvenile court or other perti-
nent state court does not have power over the case or declines to accept authority ... or 
(2) the state lacks necessary projects and services capable of satisfying the needs of 
child offenders." Sessions & Bracey, supra, at 518. Juvenile justice has the primary 
goal of rehabilitation, rather than punishment. See id. at 510. Thus, the Supreme 
Court has balanced the requirements of criminal due process against the interest in 
protecting the privacy of the child. See id. at 511·516. The Court has adopted due 
process requirements, such as the privilege against self·incrimination, representation 
by appointed counsel, confrontation of witnesses, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and 
double jeopardy, while not requiring trial by jury. See id. In addition, the Act protects 
the juvenile's rights by mandating that: (1) charges be brought by information, not 
grand jury indictment; (2) a court order is required to have the juvenile photographed 
or fingerprinted; (3) the child's name cannot be released to the media; and (4) the trial 
occur within thirty days of the beginning of a juvenile's detention. See id. at 516, 526. 
If the government proves that the juvenile has committed an act of delinquency, the 
defendant is adjudged delinquent and the judge can either suspend sentence with con-
ditions, place the juvenile on probation, or commit the child to the custody of the Attor-
ney General. See Sessions & Bracey, supra, at 535, referring to 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b). If 
placed in the Attorney General's custody, then the child can be incarcerated as long as 
he or she is kept separate from adults. See Sessions & Bracey, supra, at 537. 
22. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 343. Section 922(x)(2) reads: "It shall be unlawful 
for any person who is a juvenile to knowingly possess- (A) a handgun; or (B) ammuni-
tion that is suitable for use only in a handgun." 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (1994). 
23. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 343. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
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within Congress' commerce power.26 Michael R. appealed the 
district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.27 
He argued that § 922(x)(2) was unconstitutional for two rea-
sons: (1) the law violated the Tenth Amendment by encroach-
ing upon state criminal jurisdiction; and (2) § 922(x)(2) was un-
constitutional under Lopez because it did not regulate a com-
mercial activity nor did it contain a jurisdictional element tying 
the law to interstate commerce.28 The Ninth Circuit granted 
review of both issues.29 
III. BACKGROUND 
Congress' constitutional power to "regulate commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes" is known as the federal commerce power.30 In 
its legislative findings, Congress stated that § 922(x), the stat-
ute under which Michael R. was charged, was an exercise of its 
power to regulate interstate commerce.31 An understanding of 
how § 922(x) conforms to the history of Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence and how this history, in turn, was shaped by the 
concept of federalism, is essential to understanding the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Michael R. 
A. FEDERALISM AND THE HISTORY OF COMMERCE CLAUSE 
REVIEW 
The history of the Supreme Court's review of laws enacted 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, like the Youth Handgun 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 343. 
29. See id. at 342. This note analyzes and critiques only the Commerce Clause is-
sue. As to the Fourth Amendment suppression issue, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
lower court's ruling denying the suppression motion. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 347. 
The court found that the vehicle stop was based on probable cause to believe that a 
traffic violation had occurred and was therefore proper. See id. Any argument re-
garding a pretextual reason for the stop was precluded by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, (1996). See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 347. 
30. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RoNALD D. RoTuNDA, 
CONSTlTUTIONAL LAw 4.1, at 131 (5th Ed. 1995). 
31. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 
1839, 1858-59. 
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Safety Act, is closely tied to the Court's view of its place in 
maintaining the structure of federalism.32 Federalism is a ba-
sic structural theory of the American system of government.33 
In essence, federalism is the political theory that two inde-
pendent, sovereign systems of government are better able to 
ensure liberty and prosperity.34 A number of rationales ex-
plain why this balance of power under federalism is benefi-
cial.35 These rationales include: (1) decentralizing power en-
sures diversity and allows for experimentation in governing 
approaches by the states; (2) placing power in both national 
and state hands protects against tyranny, either from an overly 
powerful federal government or from a local majority exercising 
power over a local minority; (3) having two systems of govern-
ment increases citizen participation in political affairs and 
makes government entities more accountable to their constitu-
ents; and (4) splitting power between the national and local 
governments is the most efficient use of resources because the 
national government can focus on national problems, while lo-
cal governments can concentrate on local concerns.36 
Many consider federalism the greatest American innovation 
to political theory.37 While the existence of federalism as a ba-
sic structural element is clear, the exact balance of power it 
mandates is not expressly stated.3s Commerce Clause juris-
prudence illustrates the Court's struggle to interpret the policy 
32. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, §4.1, at 131. 
33. See Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 
GA. ST. L. REv. 1009, 1010 (1997). 
34. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Federalism can be defined as "a system where certain powers, although not denied to 
government in general, are denied to the central government and granted only to the 
governments of some or all territorial sub-units." Rubin, supra note 33, at 1012. Fed-
eralism also "refers to the extent to which consideration of state government autonomy 
has been and should be used by the judiciary as a limit on federal power." Edwin 
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 504 (1995) [hereinafter 
Chemerinsky, Valuesl. 
35. See Steven G. Calabresi, -A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": 
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 761, 775-84 (1995). 
36. See id. 
37. See Calabresi, supra note 35, at 754. ("federalism is much more important to 
the liberty and well being of the American people than any other structural feature of 
our constitutional system"). 
38. See Edwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analy-
sis, 13 GA. ST. L. REV. 959, 970 (1997) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Formalisml. 
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of federalism in defining where to strike the balance between 
congressional action and the reservation of power to the 
states.39 
1. The Early Expansive View of the Commerce Power 
From 1789 until the late 1800's, the Supreme Court was not 
often challenged to define the limits of congressional power un-
der the Commerce Clause because Congress simply did not 
pass many laws that implicated the commerce power.40 When 
the Court addressed the commerce power in the seminal case of 
Gibbons v. Ogden,41 however, it gave the commerce power a 
very broad reach.42 In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for the Court, found that the commerce power, "like all oth-
ers vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised 
to its utmost extent and acknowledges no limitations other 
than are prescribed in the constitution. "43 As long as the 
regulation did not concern an activity occurring wholly within 
one state, and only affecting that state, the Commerce Clause 
authorized Congress' action.44 In later cases, the Court held 
that the Commerce Clause also implicitly prevented the states 
from regulating in ways that discriminated against or unduly 
burdened interstate commerce.45 
This implicit prohibition became known as the dormant 
Commerce Clause.46 The Supreme Court declared that because 
Congress had the supreme power to regulate interstate com-
merce, even when Congress remained "dormant," the commerce 
power, nonetheless, prevented the states from inhibiting inter-
state commerce.47 The Court looked to the nature of the state 
regulation to determine whether the Commerce Clause and 
39. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.1, at 13l. 
40. See id" § 4.4, at 139. 
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
42. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.4, at 140. 
43. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196. 
44. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.4, at 140. 
45. See id" § 8.1, at 28l. 
46. See id. 
47. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-2, at 406-407 (2d ed. 1988); see also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
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federalism allowed the state to act.48 Under the dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, regulations impacting interstate 
activities, such as transportation, were improper.49 State 
regulation of wholly intrastate activities, such as manufactur-
ing, however, was permissible.5o 
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine remains an active 
area of constitutional jurisprudence.51 As the American econ-
omy became more national in scope, however, Congress began 
to enact more laws based on its commerce power to address 
new national problems.52 In response, the Supreme Court, be-
gan to focus its attention on defining the extent of Congress' 
commerce power within the boundaries of federalism.53 
2. The Middle Era and Restriction of the Commerce Power 
The second era of Commerce Clause history began in the 
late 1800's and continued until 1937.54 During this period, 
Congress began to address the social and economic problems 
created by the Industrial Revolution and the Great Depres-
sion.55 The Court blocked these reform attempts, claiming that 
federalism prohibited extension of the commerce power into 
these areas.56 The Court interpreted the Tenth Amendment as 
a reservation of powers to the states, creating areas of domestic 
48. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 6-4, at 408. 
49. See Cooley. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299. 
50. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
51. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997) (upholding an Ohio 
law that taxed sales of natural gas by sellers, both in-state and out-of-state, except 
sales by Mnatural gas companies," even though only in-state sellers could meet the 
definition of a natural gas company); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. 
Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (striking down a differential charge on out-of-state waste 
because the state did not justify the amount of the difference); Kassel v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down an Iowa law prohibiting the use 
of 65-foot double trailer semi trucks). 
52. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-4, at 306-07; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Mit was really the passage of the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887 that opened a new age of congressional reliance on the Com-
merce Clause for authority to exercise general police powers at the national level"). 
53. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-4, at 307. 
54. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.5, at 144. 
55. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-4, at 308; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 570 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
56. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.5, at 145. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss1/6
1998] UNITED STATES v. MICHAEL R. 59 
affairs beyond the reach of the federal government, regardless 
of whether an enumerated power appeared to reach them.57 
The Court repeatedly struck down legislation aimed at im-
proving working conditions and remedying the hardships of the 
economic depression.58 The Court used semantic distinctions, 
similar to those of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, in 
its review of Congress' actions.59 While regulating the shipping 
of goods across state lines, for example, was within Congress' 
power, regulating the production of those same goods was 
not.60 Ultimately, the test became whether the regulated ac-
tivity had a "direct" or "indirect" effect on interstate com-
merce.61 If the activity directly affected interstate commerce, 
Congress could regulate it.62 If the effect was only an indirect 
one, however, Congress was powerless, and regulatory power 
fell to the states.63 The underlying rationale behind these dis-
tinctions was the laissez-faire economic philosophy of the Jus-
tices.64 The Court employed formalistic distinctions, supported 
57. See id. The Tenth Amendment states "[tlhe powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
58. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.5, at 145. 
59. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-4, at 307-08. 
60. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (shipping); Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (production). 
61. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 30, § 4.5, at 145; see also Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935). 
62. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 30, § 4.5, at 145. 
63. See id.; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554-55. 
64. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting); see aLso Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But a constitution is not in-
tended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the or-
ganic relation of the citizen to the State or of Laissez faire"). The Court not only re-
jected Congress' actions as disrupting federalism, but it also found that state regula-
tions were violating other constitutional protections. This dual attack had the effect of 
preventing any government from exercising some control over the economy. See Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting). For examples of federal legislation struck 
down by the Court, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down a 
law which regulated minimum wages and maximum work hours of coal miners); 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, (1935) (striking down the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which authorized federal codes that regulated 
trade practices, wages, prices, work hours and collective bargaining); RaiLroad Retire· 
ment Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating law creating a mandatory 
retirement and pension plan for interstate carriers); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 
251 (1918) (the Child Labor Case, which struck down a federal law prohibiting inter-
state shipment of goods manufactured by children under fourteen). The Court was 
equally narrow-minded with state laws. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605 (Souter, J., dis-
9
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by its interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and the balance 
of power under federalism, as tools to stop government from 
regulating the private sector.65 
As the Court continued to strike down economic reform laws 
during the New Deal era, Congress and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt became increasingly unhappy with the Court's deci-
sions.66 This conflict continued to grow until one member of 
the Supreme Court, Justice Owen Roberts, began to vote the 
other way, creating a majority that sustained the laws, rather 
than striking them down.67 President Roosevelt then ap-
pointed seven Supreme Court Justices between 1937 and 1941, 
ensuring the end of the era limiting the commerce power.68 
3. The Modern Era of the Substantial Effects and Rational 
Basis Tests 
Beginning in 1937, with the watershed case of NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,69 the Court ~xpressly rejected 
the prior era's theory of federalism.7o The Court discarded that 
period's semantic distinctions and adopted a more deferential 
approach to analyzing congressional exercise of the commerce 
power.71 After Jones & Laughlin, the Court would not look 
solely to whether a regulated activity actually crossed state 
lines or directly affected interstate commerce, but instead 
would examine whether the activity substantially affected in-
terstate commerce.72 Thus, even wholly intrastate activities 
senting); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (initiating a line of cases 
that thwarted state attempts to regulate economic activity based on Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process grounds). 
65. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 970-71. 
66. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.7, at 154. This "unhappiness" 
eventually led to President Roosevelt's infamous court packing plan. See id. at 154-55. 
67. See id. at 155. 
68. See id.; Chemerinsky, Values, supra note 34, at 512-13. 
69. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
70. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.8, at 155. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. at 155-56; see also Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37. The Court stated 
that: 
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately con-
sidered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
10
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could be regulated under the Commerce Clause if their effect 
on interstate commerce was substantial.73 illtimately, the 
Court also increased the deference it paid to congressional de-
cisions in determining whether the activity substantially af-
fected interstate commerce.74 
Under the rational basis test, the Supreme Court would no 
longer make its own factual determination of whether the ac-
tivity substantially affected interstate commerce.75 Instead, all 
the Court required was a showing of some rational basis for 
Congress to find a substantial interstate commerce connec-
tion.76 As long as some rational basis for the law existed, the 
Court would uphold it.77 
The theoretical basis for a vast expansion of the commerce 
power came in the case of Wickard v. Filburn.78 In Wickard, 
the Court held that Congress could regulate activities that, by 
themselves, did not have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, if many separate instances of the activity would 
have a substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce.79 
This development opened the door for Congress to regulate the 
activities of individual citizens that, viewed separately, had 
only a trivial impact on interstate commerce.80 
The Court's review process during this period returned the 
commerce power to its earlier, near absolute, status.81 This 
approach allowed Congress to pass many of the laws considered 
important to modern society.82 During the next fifty-eight 
1d. 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied 
the power to exercise that control. 
73. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.8, at 156. 
74. See id. at 155. 
75. See id.; see also Katzenbach v. Mc Clung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964). 
76. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.8, at 156. 
77. See id. 
78. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
79. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28. 
80. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-5, at 310. 
81. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 525. 
82. See id. The Court sustained modem laws involving economic reform, civil 
rights and environmental regulation as being proper exercises of the commerce power. 
See id. 
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years, the Court allowed federal power to expand with almost 
no boundaries, even into areas of traditional state concern.sa 
4. United States v. Lopez: A Return to Limits on the Commerce 
Power 
Much to the surprise of observers, the Supreme Court went 
against the deferential tradition established in Commerce 
Clause analysis by striking down the Gun Free School Zones 
Act in United States v. Lopez, in 1995.84 The case arose from 
the conviction of Alphonso Lopez, Jr. for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(I)(A).85 Lopez, a twelfth-grade student, brought a .38 
caliber revolver and five bullets to his high school in San Anto-
nio, Texas.86 Acting on an anonymous tip, local law enforce-
ment officers arrested Lopez and filed state charges against 
him.s7 The state dismissed the charges after federal agents 
charged Lopez with a violation of § 922(q)(I)(A).88 Eventually, 
Lopez was indicted on one count of "knowingly [possessing] a 
firearm at a place [he knew] or ha[d] reasonable cause to be-
lieve, [was] a school zone."89 Lopez moved to dismiss the in-
dictment on the grounds that the statute was "unconstitutional 
as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over 
our public schools."90 The district court denied the motion to 
sa. See Regan, supra note 1, at 559, 562. 
84. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. 
REv. 674, 675 (1995). 
85. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52. Section 922(q)(I)(A) provided that -lilt shall be 
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individ-
ual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone" IS U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(I)(A) (1988 & Supp. v 1993). A school zone was defined as -(A) in, or on the 
grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B) within a distance of 1,000 feet 
from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school" IS U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (1988 
& Supp. v 1993). Section 922(q) has been modified twice since 1988. The 1994 
amendment added a new § 922(q)(I), which set forth the law's legislative findings. See 
IS U.S.C. § 922(q)(l) (1994). In 1996, the offense description was amended to read -lilt 
shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in 
or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." IS U.S.C.A § 922(q)(2)(A) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). 
86. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
87. See id. 
88. Seeid. 
S9. [d. (quoting IS U.S.C. 922(q)(I)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993.». 
90. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
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dismiss and Lopez was subsequently tried and convicted.91 
Lopez appealed his conviction to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.92 The Fifth Circuit reversed the 
conviction, relying heavily on the lack of any congressional 
findings supporting an extension of the commerce power to 
firearm possession in a school zone.93 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's result, al-
beit on different grounds.94 The Court conducted an independ-
ent review, examining the constitutionality of the statute on its 
merits.95 The Court then held that § °922(q) was unconstitu-
tional because it did not regulate a commercial activity.96 
Therefore, the law went beyond Congress' commerce power and 
intruded upon the powers reserved to the states.97 
One of the most widely noted aspects of the Lopez decision 
was the articulation of the "commercial activity test. "98 The 
Court held that Congress could only use the commerce power to 
regulate commercial activity.99 The Court reasoned that prior 
cases, in which it had sustained congressional actions, involved 
either a statute that regulated economic activities or one that 
contained an explicit interstate commerce jurisdictional ele-
ment.100 In Lopez's case, the Court found that the act of 
bringing a gun to school did not have commercial implica-
91. See id.at 551-52. 
92. See id. at 552. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. The Court noted that Congress is not required to make findings sup-
porting the use of the commerce power, thus the absence of findings in this case waa 
not fatal. See id. at 562-63. The Court stated, however, that legislative findings would 
be considered in the analysis if they were present. See id. The dissenters agreed that 
legislative findings, at best, give a law "the benefit of some extra leeway," Id. at 617 
(Breyer, J. dissenting) (emphaais in original), and at worst "go no further than ex-
pressing what is obviously implicit in the substantive legislation, at such a conclusory 
level of generality aa to add virtually nothing to the record." Id. at 612 n.2 (Souter, J. 
dissenting). 
95. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. 
96. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551,565-66. 
97. See id. at 551. 
98. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; Althouse, supra note 6, at 813; Merritt, supra note 
84, at 695. 
99. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
100. See id. at 559-61. 
13
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tions.101 The Court held that "possession of a gun in a local 
school zone [was] in no sense an economic activity that might, 
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of 
interstate commerce. "102 In addition, unlike other statutes 
containing a jurisdictional element that required the govern-
ment to prove a tie to interstate commerce on a case-by-case 
basis, the Gun Free School Zones Act had no such element.103 
In defense of the statute's constitutionality, the government 
argued that the presence of guns in and around schools leads to 
violence and this violence adversely affects the nation's econ-
omy by deterring travel and increasing national insurance 
costs, and by threatening the learning environment, to the stu-
dents' detriment.104 An effective education is crucial to the 
creation of an efficient national work force.105 Therefore, the 
government reasoned that disruption of the ~eaming environ-
ment caused by gun violence has a negative effect on the na-
tional economy. 106 
In conducting its independent review of the nature of the 
activity regulated, the Court expressly dismissed this "costs of 
crime" rationale as requiring the Court to "pile inference upon 
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general po-
lice power . . .. "107 The Court refused to interpret the Com-
merce Clause as authorizing Congress to reach into traditional 
areas of state power, such as education and criminallaw.108 To 
do so, the Court held, would violate federalism as the Court 
defined it. Sustaining this law would be the equivalent of con-
cluding (1) that the commerce power could reach into anyas-
pect of a citizen's life, even those of traditional state concern, 
101. See id. at 56l. 
102. [d. at 567. 
103. See id. at 56l. 
104. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64. 
105. See id. at 564. 
106. See id. 
107. [d. at 564,567. 
108. See id. 
14
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and (2) that there can be no "distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local."109 
B. THE YOUTH HANDGUN SAFETY ACT AND THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE 
Title 18 of the United States Code, § 922, defines federal 
crimes involving firearms.110 Section 922 became law in 1968 
and was enacted to address aspects of firearm possession, use, 
manufacturing, and shipping.111 Regulated activities include: 
licensing firearms dealers; selling and transporting weapons; 
possession of firearms by felons, fugitives, addicts, and illegal 
aliens; and possession of machine guns and other altered 
weapons.112 In 1994, subsection (x) was added to § 922 to com-
bat the problems associated with juvenile handgun posses-
sion.113 
Section 922(x) contains six parts.114 Part 1 prohibits the 
sale or transfer of handguns or handgun ammunition to some-
one the seller knows, or should know, is a juvenile.115 Part 2 
prohibits juveniles from knowingly possessing a handgun or 
handgun ammunition.116 Part 3 identifies juvenile handgun 
possession excepted from the law.117 Finally, parts 4, 5, and 6 
address the provision's procedural aspects.118 
109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
110. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). 
111. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922, Historical Note p. 227 (West 1976). 
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). 
113. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 
1839, 1858-59. 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1994). 
115. See id. "(1) It shall be unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise trans-
fer to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a juve-
nile- (A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun." ld. 
116. See id. "(2) It shall be unlawful for any person who is a juvenile to knowingly 
possess-- (A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun." 
ld. 
117. See id. 
(3) This subsection does not apply to-- (A) a temporary transfer of a 
handgun or ammunition to a juvenile or to the possession or use of a 
handgun or ammunition by a juvenile if the handgun and ammunition 
are possessed and used by the juvenile-- (i) in the course of employ-
ment, in the course of ranching or farming related to activities at the 
residence of the juvenile (or on property used for ranching or farming at 
15
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Unlike § 922(q), the subsection challenged in United States 
v. Lopez, § 922(x) has a detailed legislative history.u9 The 
congressional fmdings describe why Congress prohibited the 
sale of handguns to, and the possession of handguns by, 
[d. 
[d. 
which the juvenile, with the permission of the property owner or lessee, 
is performing activities related to the operation of the farm or ranch), 
target practice, hunting, or a course of instruction in the safe and law-
ful use of a handgun; (ii) with the prior written consent of the juvenile's 
parent or guardian who is not prohibited by Federal, State or local law 
from possessing a firearm, except-- (I) during transportation by the ju-
venile of an unloaded handgun in a locked container directly from the 
place of transfer to a place at which an activity described in clause (i) is 
to take place and transportation by the juvenile of that handgun, un-
loaded and in a locked container, directly from the place at which such 
an activity took place to the transferor; or (II) with respect to ranching 
or farming activities as described in clause 0), a juvenile may possess 
and use a handgun or ammunition with the prior written approval of 
the juvenile's parent or legal guardian and at the direction of an adult 
who is not prohibited by Federal, State or local law from possessing a 
firearm; (iii) the juvenile has the prior written consent in the juvenile's 
possession at all times when a handgun is in the possession of the juve-
nile; and Ov) in accordance with State and local law; (B) a juvenile who 
is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or the National 
Guard who possesses or is armed with a handgun in the line of duty; 
(C) a transfer by inheritance of title (but not possession) of a handgun 
or ammunition to a juvenile; or (D) the possession of a handgun or am-
munition by a juvenile taken in defense of the juvenile or other persons 
against an intruder into the residence of the juvenile or a residence in 
which the juvenile is an invited guest. 
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x): 
(4) A handgun or ammunition, the possession of which is transferred to 
a juvenile in circumstances in which the transferor is not in violation of 
this subsection shall not be subject to permanent confiscation by the 
Government if its possession by the juvenile subsequently becomes un-
lawful because of the conduct of the juvenile, but shall be returned to 
the lawful owner when such handgun or ammunition is no longer re-
quired by the Government for the purposes of investigation or prosecu-
tion. 
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term "juvenile" means a person 
who is less than 18 years of age. 
(6) (A) In a prosecution of a violation of this subsection, the court shall 
require the presence of a juvenile defendant's parent or legal guardian 
at all proceedings. (B) The court may use the contempt power to en-
force subparagraph (A). (C) The court may excuse attendance of a par-
ent or legal guardian of a juvenile defendant at a proceeding in a prose-
cution of a violation of this subsection for good cause shown. 
119. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 
1839, 1858-59. Section 922(q) was revised at the same time § 922(x) was enacted and 
the new version of § 922(q) included part (1), which set forth the legislative findings 
supporting the Gun Free School Zones Act. See 18 U.S.C. §922(q) (1994). The Lopez 
court rejected these after-the-fact fmdings. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995). 
16
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juveniles.12o Congress gave two main justifications for the 
regulation: (1) crime involving guns, drugs and juveniles is a 
pervasive national problem that cannot be solved at the local 
level alone; and (2) guns have an effect on interstate commerce 
because the weapons generally travel in interstate commerce 
and the crime and violence associated with juvenile handgun 
possession affect interstate commerce.121 Accordingly, 
"[i]nasmuch as illicit drug activity and related violent crime 
overflow State lines and national boundaries, the Congress has 
power under the interstate Commerce Clause and other 
provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to combat 
these problems. "122 
1. Juvenile Handgun Possession is a National Problem 
Congress found that the problem of juvenile handgun use 
exceeded the capabilities of local and state authorities.123 As 
stated in the congressional findings, handguns move especially 
easily from state to state, as do illicit drugs and the gangs that 
ship them.124 This mobility allows for easy access by juveniles, 
creates a ripe environment for the development of violent 
criminals, and fosters the random use of handguns on the 
streets. 125 
More importantly, Congress found that violent crime re-
sulting from juvenile handgun use and the illicit drug trade go 
"hand-in-hand."126 Attempting to eliminate one without con-
trolling the other would be ineffective.127 Strong attempts by 
120. See H.R. REp. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 
1839, 1858-59. 
121. See id. 
122. ld. at 1859. 
123. See id. "Individual States and localities find it impossible to handle the prob-
lem by themselves; even States and localities that have made a strong effort to prevent, 
detect, and punish crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or in-
ability of other States and localities to take strong measures." ld. 
124. See id. at 1858. 
125. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 
1839, 1858. "[PJroblems with crime at the loca1level are exacerbated by the interstate 
movement of drugs, guns, and criminal gangs; firearms and ammunition, and hand-
guns in particular, move easily in interstate commerce .... " ld. 
126. ld. 
127. See id. at 1858-59. 
17
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some states to crack down on these activities had been unsuc-
cessful because other states were unable or unwilling to enact 
similarly strict measures.128 Therefore, it appeared that only a 
rigorous national approach to the problem of juvenile handgun 
possession and use would successfully curb violent crime and 
illegal drug trafficking.129 
2. Juvenile Handgun Possession Affects Interstate Commerce 
Congress found that juvenile handgun use affects interstate 
commerce in two ways.130 First, a handgun, its parts, ammuni-
tion and raw materials, have all moved in interstate com-
merce.131 Second, Congress recognized a "costs of crime" rela-
tionship between juvenile handgun possession and violent use, 
and interstate commerce.132 Gun violence deters interstate 
and international travel,133 Economies suffer in areas where 
gun violence occurs because the ordinary citizen traveler may 
believe that violent crime exists unchecked in those areas and, 
thus, will avoid them.134 The damaging effect of violent crime 
on tourism, coupled with the interstate character of the illicit 
drug trade and handgun transportation, led Congress to con-
clude that juvenile handgun possession and use involves and 
impacts interstate commerce and, therefore, can be regulated 
under the Commerce Clause.135 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCmT'S ANALYSIS IN MICHAEL R. 
The Ninth Circuit approached Michael R. mindful of Com-
merce Clause history and, in particular, the changes mandated 
128. See id. at 1859. 
129. See id. 
130. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711 at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1839,1858. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. "While criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens 
may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due to the concern that 
violent crime is not under control." 1d. Foreigners may decline to travel in the United 
States for the same reason. See id. 
135. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711 at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1839,1858. 
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by Lopez.136 The court also noted that the constitutionality of 
§ 922(x) was an issue of first impression in the circuit courts.137 
The court began its analysis, regarding whether regulation 
of juvenile handgun possession was constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause, by stating that the court reviews de novo 
legal questions, such as the constitutionality of a law.l38 The 
court next considered the basis of commerce power applicable 
to § 922(x)(2).139 In Lopez, the Supreme Court had recognized 
three acceptable areas of commerce power regulation.14o Con-
gress may regulate "(1) the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (3) those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce. "141 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the parties that 
§ 922(x) could only implicate the third category: activities hav-
ing a substantial relation to interstate commerce.142 
136. See United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). 
137. See id. at 344. Only one reported district court decision had reached the issue, 
United States v. Cardoza, 914 F.Supp. 683 (D. Mass. 1996), affd, 129 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 
1997). See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344 n.2. The district court in Cardoza found 
§ 922(x)(2) constitutional, holding that § 922(x) regulated activity that had a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce. See Cardoza, 914 F.Supp. at 687. The court 
pointed out that § 922(x) regulated the supply and demand sides of the juvenile mar-
ket, but used this fact to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce, not to de-
termine that juvenile handgun possession was a commercial activity. See id. Indeed, 
the district court did not mention Lopez's commercial activity requirement in its dis-
cussion of § 922(x). See id. After Michael R. was decided, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in United States IJ. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 8 
(lst Cir. 1997). This decision contained a more complete discussion of the commercial 
activity requirement, using the supply and demand elements of § 922(x) to determine 
that juvenile possession of handguns was a commercial activity in this context. See id. 
at 12-13. 
138. See Michael R., 90 F .3d at 343. 
139. See id. at 344. 
140. See id. 
141. ld. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995». The first ba-
sis of the commerce power addresses regulation of the items of commerce that move 
between the states, such as food, people, or guns that move across state lines. See 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. The instrumentalities of commerce are the actual means of 
moving items between the states, such as railways and airplanes. See id. The third 
category is the modem doctrine which allows regulation of intrastate activities that 
have a substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 558-59. 
142. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
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The Ninth Circuit's analysis focused on distinguishing Mi-
chael R. from Lopez.143 The court pointed out that Lopez was 
decided by a "narrow" majority.l44 The Ninth Circuit noted 
that the Supreme Court found possession of a firearm in a 
school zone was not sufficiently related to interstate commerce 
to be a constitutional exercise of the commerce power.l45 In 
addition, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Lopez Court re-
jected the "costs of crime" and "national productivity" ration-
ales advanced by the government in support of § 922(q).146 The 
Ninth Circuit then proceeded to evaluate the constitutionality 
of § 922(x)'s prohibition of juvenile handgun possession under 
Lopez. 147 
The Ninth Circuit relied on a single sentence from the Lopez 
decision to support its finding that juvenile handgun possession 
was a commercial activity.l48 In Lopez, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote that the statute regulating the possession of 
firearms in school zones was only a criminal statute and was 
"not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activ-
ity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless 
the intrastate activity were regulated. "149 The Ninth Circuit 
stated that, in contrast, prohibiting juvenile possession of 
handguns under § 922(x)(2) was part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity.150 The court defined § 922(x) as the larger 
regulatory scheme, finding that the statute as a whole sought 
to regulat. the entire juvenile handgun market.151 This regu-
143. See id. 
144. See id. In Lopez, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550. Justice Ken-
nedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, in which Justice O'Connor joined, and Jus-
tice Thomas wrote another concurrence. See id. Justices Stevens and Souter filed 
dissents and also, along with Justice Ginsburg, joined in Justice Breyer's dissenting 
opinion. See id. 
145. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 344-45. 
148. See id. at 344. 
149. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
150. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344 ("[flirst we note that this statute is part of a 
larger regulation that deals with the sale, delivery, or transfer of firearms to a juve-
nile"). 
151. See id. 
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latory plan was accomplished both by prohibiting the sale or 
transfer of handguns to juveniles, in part one, and by prohibit-
ing the possession of handguns by juveniles, in part two.152 
Thus, the court found that § 922(x), as a whole, sought to 
regulate the complete juvenile handgun market by striking at 
both its supply and demand sides.153 Striking down the prohi-
bition against juvenile possession of handguns would nullify 
Congress' attempt to create a larger regulatory scheme for the 
juvenile handgun market. l54 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held 
that juvenile handgun possession was a commercial activity 
under Lopez because it represented the demand side of the 
commercial juvenile handgun market.155 
After defining possession, for the purposes of § 922(x), as an 
economic activity, the Ninth Circuit then explained why Mi-
chael R.'s possession had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.156 The court relied on the statute's own legislative 
findings, as well as other legislative findings relating to gun 
violence, to reach its conclusion.157 
The Ninth Circuit first noted that Lopez allowed the courts 
to consider legislative findings when evaluating the constitu-
tionality of a law.15S The court then expressly adopted 
§ 922(x)'s congressional findings to support the use of the com-
merce power to prohibit juvenile possession of handguns.159 In 
these findings, Congress ascertained that juvenile handgun 
possession substantially affects interstate commerce because: 
(1) the handgun parts, ammunition and raw materials move in 
interstate commerce; (2) violent crime resulting from juvenile 
handgun possession and use deters interstate travel of citizens 
and foreigners; and (3) handgun possession and illegal drug 
152. See id. 
153. See id. 
154. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
155. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
156. See id. at 344-45. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 344 n.3. 
159. See id. at 345. These findings are discussed supra in section III. B. 
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trafficking go hand-in-hand.16o The Ninth Circuit declared the 
first two findings to be self-evident and simply stated that ju-
venile possession of handguns "implicate [d) interstate com-
merce through the manufacturing process and by its deterrent 
effect on interstate travel. "161 Regarding the third finding, the 
court explained that juveniles playa role in the interstate traf-
ficking of illegal drugs, as "runners," and that crime statistics 
show that many of them carry guns to complete their activi-
ties.162 Therefore, the drug trade would suffer through prohibi-
tion of juvenile handgun possession because juvenile runners 
would not be able to arm themselves in the execution of their 
duties.163 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit further stated that gun vio-
lence, in general, does affect commerce, and juvenile possession 
and use of handguns adds to this violence.l64 The court refer-
enced its recent decision in Mack v. United States,165 in which 
the court adopted the legislative history of the Brady Act.166 In 
Mack, albeit in dicta, the court stated that "[t]he legislative 
history of the Brady Act also contains findings that gun vio-
lence affects commerce, and we accept those findings. "167 In 
Michael R., the court adopted these findings without explicitly 
describing or explaining them.168 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the juvenile hand-
gun possession prohibited by §922(x)(2) was, in fact, an eco-
nomic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce 
and was, therefore, an activity that could be constitutionally 
160. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345, (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-711 at 390-91 (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1858-59). 
161. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
165. 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995). 
166. See Mack, 66 F.3d at 1028 n.5. (citing the Brady Handgun Control Act, P.L. 
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(8))). Section 922(8) created a 
national waiting period for a handgun purchase and required that local law enforce-
ment officials perform background checks on handgun purchasers. See Mack, 66 F.3d 
at 1027. 
167. Mack, 66 F.3d at 1028 n.5. 
168. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345. 
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regulated by Congress pursuant to its commerce power.169 As 
a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, 
holding that § 922(x)(2) was constitutionaL170 
v. CRITIQUE 
On a factual level, there is little difference between Michael 
R.'s activity, knowingly possessing a handgun, and Lopez's ac-
tivity, knowingly possessing a handgun in a school zone. The 
factual similarities make it difficult to find that the former is a 
commercial activity, while the latter "has nothing to do with 
commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly 
one might define those terms."171 In fact, Lopez's activity was 
arguably more "commercial" than Michael R's because another 
student paid Lopez $40 to bring the gun to schooL172 Regard-
less, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that Lopez's activ-
ity had commercial implications.173 An examination of the 
facts reveals no reason why Michael R's action should be con-
sidered commercial. If Lopez's action was not commercial, Mi-
chael R's could not be either. 
The true basis for the distinction lies not on a factual level 
but on a conceptual one: federalism. The ruling in Michael R. 
is best viewed as evidence of the basic flaw in the Supreme 
Court's attempts to defme the balance of power mandated by 
federalism throughout the history of commerce power re-
view.174 Beneath the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause deci-
sions is a weighing of the value of the law in question against 
the value of the separation of powers between the federal and 
state governments.175 In each case, the Court has used a 
169. See id. 
170. See id. 
171. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
172. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993). The other stu-
dent was apparently planning to use the gun in a "gang war." &e id. The Supreme 
Court's decision does not mention this fact. See Althouse, supra note 6, at 796 n.24. 
173. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
174. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 970. 
175. See id. at 973-74. 
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framework of legal theory to justify its initial decision about 
the desirability of the law.176 Michael R. serves as a reminder 
that marking the boundaries of federalism in Commerce Clause 
review requires a functional approach, involving the weighing 
of many factors.l77 Congress, not the judiciary, is properly 
charged with making these determinations.178 Michael R. ex-
emplifies the problems that are created when the courts be-
come involved in this political decision. 
A. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IS THE HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT'S THEORY OF FEDERALISM 
Congress' exercise of the commerce power is perhaps the 
ultimate battleground in the conflict to determine the proper 
balance between .the powers of the national and state govern-
ments. The importance of interstate commerce in the Ameri-
can economy was on the rise long before the founders drafted 
the Constitution.179 Indeed, a major factor in the decision to 
abandon the Articles of Confederation and create the Constitu-
tion was the increasing importance of eliminating barriers to 
free trade between the states.180 Justice Kennedy recognized 
the ever-increasing role interstate commerce plays in modern 
American life when, in Lopez, he stated that "[i]n a sense any 
conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate 
commercial origin or consequence . . . ."181 As a result, the 
Commerce Clause has the potential to justify the federal gov-
ernment's reach into any intrastate activity, thereby effectively 
eliminating the separation of powers between the national and 
state governments.182 Federalism was designed to prevent this 
176. See Regan, supra note 1, at 562. 
177. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 973. 
178. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577, (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("To be sure, one conclu-
sion that could be drawn from The Federalist Papers is that the balance between na-
tional and state power is entrusted in its entirety to the political process."); Calabresi, 
supra note 35, at 790 (noting that "[tJor many years now, it has been the prevailing 
view both in the Supreme Court and the law schools that constitutional federalism 
guarantees should not be enforced judicially"). 
179. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 6-3, at 404. 
180. See id. 
181. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
182. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.1, at 131. 
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result. It was designed to protect diversity and experimenta-
tion; to protect against tyranny of the national government; to 
increase political activity and accountability; and to promote 
the most effective use of governmental power to solve prob-
lems.l83 The fact that the Commerce Clause seems to touch 
every aspect of American life is in direct conflict with the no-
tion that there must be .two separate sovereign governments to 
protect our liberty and prosperity.l84 The Supreme Court's re-
view of Congress' exercise of the commerce power has been an 
attempt to define the relationship between the Commerce 
Clause and federalism. l85 The Court has been unable to ac-
complish this balancing in a consistent and meaningful way.l86 
The history of Commerce Clause review can be described as 
the Supreme Court oscillating between two interpretations of 
the Tenth Amendment. The first interpretation is that the 
Amendment represented merely a "truism," simply stating that 
Congress' powers are limited to those expressed or implied in 
the Constitution, but having no bounds beyond constitutional 
limits, such as the Bill of Rights.187 The second view is that 
the Tenth Amendment "reserves a zone of activities to the 
states and Congress may not intrude into this zone, even when 
it is exercising its power under Article I of the Constitution."188 
The Supreme Court has struck the balance of federalism by 
applying the theory to which it adhered at the time and creat-
ing a structure of legal rules; either giving Congress broad 
power, by upholding its laws (the truism view), or reserving 
some power for the states, by striking down federal laws (the 
reserved powers view). 
183. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 973-74. 
184. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.1, at 131. 
185. See id. 
186. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the history of 
Commerce Clause review as a "chastening" experience for the Court). 
187. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 971. The Supreme Court ar-
ticulated the idea that the Tenth Amendment was a truism in United States II. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a truism that all is retained 
which has not been surrendered"). The Court adhered to this view, although it did not 
articulate it as such, during the first period of Commerce Clause history. See Chem-
erinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 971. 
188. Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 971. 
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In the early period, for example, the Court, particularly 
Chief Justice Marshall, took the truism view of the Tenth 
Amendment.189 The new nation was still forming and a strong 
central government was important to ensuring a coherent un-
ion. 190 In addition, Congress simply did not pass many laws 
under the commerce power during this period and, as a result, 
few laws infringed on the areas of traditional state power.191 
The Court created the legal structure of congressional powers 
with no limit other than the Constitution itself and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, which merely required that a law be 
helpful in reaching a legitimate goal.192 The wide extent of 
Congress' power even served as a justification for the Court to 
prevent the states from regulating when Congress had not 
acted. 193 
During the second era of Commerce Clause review, the Su-
preme Court took the view that federalism and the Tenth 
Amendment reserved powers to the states.194 The Court 
viewed Congress' actions as threats to federalism, representing 
the tyranny of the national government in regulating local, pri-
vate businesses.195 Thus, the Court created a legal structure to 
enforce its theory of the proper balance of power under feder-
alism, limiting the commerce power to those activities which 
189. See id. 
190. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.4, at 139. 
191. See id. 
192. See id. at 140. The Necessary and Proper Clause derives from Article I, §8 of 
the Constitution, which provides that Congress has the power to Mmake all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the powers granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall gave the authoritative definition of 
the term Mnecessary and proper[:]" M[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope 
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution, are constitutional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. This interpreta-
tion, in essence, gives Congress the power to make laws that are convenient to the 
execution of its duties and sets merely a threshold standard of review. See TRIBE, 
supra note 47, § 5-3, at 301-303. 
193. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 6-2, at 403-404. 
194. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 971. 
195. See id. at 971-72. 
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(1) were interstate as opposed to intrastate and (2) directly af-
fected interstate commerce.196 
During the modern, pre-Lopez period, the Court returned to 
the truism interpretation of the Tenth Amendment.197 The 
Court reviewed many laws that had tremendous beneficial im-
pacts on American life.198 Although the independence of the 
states may have suffered somewhat, these laws were either 
highly beneficial to general prosperity, like the New Deal leg-
islation, or they advanced the ideal of federalism by protecting 
local minorities from the tyranny of local majorities, like the 
Civil Rights laws of the 1960'S.199 The Court simply did not 
view its function as deciding the balance of power between the 
states and federal government.200 Instead, the Court deferred 
to Congress.201 The Supreme Court created new legal struc-
tures to facilitate this deference. During this period, exercise of 
the commerce power was justified if the regulated activity had 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if many indi-
vidual actions needed to be combined to create that substantial 
impact.202 In addition, the Court looked only for a rational ba-
sis for Congress' decision to regulate; the Court did not under-
take an independent search for Congress' intended basis for the 
law.203 
United States v. Lopez, then, can be viewed as an instance 
where the Court decided that Congress had gone too far.204 
The Court viewed the Gun Free School Zones Act as a threat to 
federalism and was committed to curbing the expansion of the 
196. See NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 30, § 4.5, at 145. 
197. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 972. 
198. See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 5-5, at 310-11. 
199. See id. 
200. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter J., dissenting) ("Adoption of rational basis 
review expressed the recognition that the Court had no sustainable basis for subjecting 
economic regulation as such to judicial policy judgments"). 
201. See Merritt, supra note 84, at 682. 
202. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). 
203. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 
(1981). 
204. See Merritt, supra note 84, at 712. Merritt finds that "[tlhe important point [of 
Lopezl is that Congress must proceed in a way that recognizes the possibility of some 
limits and takes the doctrine of enumerated powers seriously." ld. at 690. 
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commerce power.205 Congress' complete failure to justify its 
intrusion into the traditional state zones of power of education 
and criminal law signaled to the Court that federalism itself 
was threatened.206 The Court was determined to put some life 
back into federalism, and to do so, it created yet another legal 
structure, the commercial activity test.207 In Lopez, federalism 
was preserved by defming Lopez's gun possession as a non-
commercial activity that was beyond the commerce power.208 
B. MICHAEL R. 's PLACE IN COMMERCE CLAUSE HISTORY 
Michael R. involved a criminal charge pursuant to a law 
that is almost indistinguishable from the law at issue in Lopez. 
The Ninth Circuit, in essence, decided that the Youth Handgun 
Safety Act benefited, rather than threatened, federalism and, 
thus, the court created a legal structure to justify its decision to 
uphold the law. The Supreme Court followed the same proce-
dure to reach the opposite result in Lopez. 
1. How the Youth Handgun Safety Act Benefits, Rather Than 
Threatens, Federalism 
The Ninth Circuit relied on legislative findings to determine 
that gun violence and juvenile handgun possession could have 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.209 In fact, the 
court stated it had "no doubt that possession of a handgun by a 
juvenile, as a general matter, could have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. "'.no The court also found that the illicit 
drug trade, in which juveniles with handguns played an in-
creasing role, was a national problem.211 Thus, the Youth 
Handgun Safety Act furthered a goal of federalism because it 
allowed for the most efficient and effective allocation of re-
sources by allowing the national government to combat a na-
tional problem that overwhelmed the abilities of local govern-
205. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
206. See id. 
207. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 982. 
208. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 561. 
209. See United States v. Michael R, 90 F.3d 343, 344-45 (9th Cir. 1996). 
210. 1d. at 344. 
211. See id. at 345. 
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ments.212 The Ninth Circuit stated that its "common sense un-
derstanding of the facts" led it to conclude "that the law was a 
proper exercise of the commerce power.213 Indeed, the court 
made no mention of federalism in its opinion, indicating that it 
did not view this law as a threat to federalism, but rather as a 
beneficial exercise of the commerce power. 
2. The Legal Structures Created to Allow the Court to Reach 
this Decision 
Although the Ninth Circuit viewed § 922(x) as a beneficial 
law, in order to uphold it, the court needed to satisfy the legal 
structure created in Lopez: the commercial activity test.214 To 
that end, the court simply added to the Lopez structure, 
adopting yet another doctrine properly termed the "market 
regulation exception. "215 
In Michael R. the court examined the concept of possession 
in relation to the larger regulatory scheme of § 922(x).216 Pos-
session, as prohibited by § 922(x)(2), represented not the simple 
act of possessing a handgun but rather the outcome of the 
commercial activity of purchasing the handgun or receiving it 
in transfer.217 Thus, § 922(x)(1), which outlawed the sale or 
transfer of handguns to juveniles, and § 922(x)(2) regulate the 
entire juvenile handgun market by addressing both its supply 
and demand sides.218 When Congress regulated an entire 
market, the court held, the regulation of possession satisfied 
Lopez's commercial-activity requirement because the larger 
212. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711 at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1839,1859. 
213. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345. 
214. See id. at 344. 
215. See id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court, in finding the statute 
constitutional, had relied, in part, on the fact that "there is an overall regulatory 
scheme to try and keep guns out of minors' hands requiring intrastate regulation." Id. 
at 343 n.l. 
216. See id. at 344. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
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regulatory scheme would be hampered if possession could not 
be controlled.219 
This market-regulation approach distinguishes the statute 
at issue in Michael R. froin the statute in Lopez. Section 
922(q), the Lopez statute, only addressed possession and use of 
a firearm in a school zone.220 The law did not prohibit selling 
or transferring a firearm to a person who would possess or use 
the weapon in a school zone.221 Thus, § 922(q) clearly did not 
seek to address the market of firearms possessed or used in 
school zones, assuming such a market existed and could be 
regulated.222 Section 922(x), on the other hand, does address 
an entire market.223 
Use of the market regulation scheme as a means to define a 
commercial activity can be viewed as an extension of the 
Wickard doctrine, which allowed the courts to consider the cu-
mulative effect of a multitude of trivial acts on interstate com-
merce.224 In Michael R., the Ninth Circuit was not only com-
bining the cumulative effect of the same activity nationwide, as 
in the case of farmers growing extra wheat in Wickard, but it 
was also aggregating two different types of activities to create a 
market effect, namely the sale of handguns to, and the posses-
sion of handguns by, juveniles.225 The aggregate effect of dif-
ferent activity types, as seen in Michael R., makes juvenile 
handgun possession an economic activity, even though many 
acts of juvenile handgun possession throughout the country, by 
themselves, might not implicate economic activity at all.226 
The other aspect of the legal structure the Ninth Circuit 
used in Michael R. was "due deference to the legislative find-
ings. "227 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit gave 
219. See id. 
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). 
221. See id. 
222. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
223. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
224. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28. 
225. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. 
226. See id. 
227. Id. at 345. 
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weight to the same type of generalized, conclusory legislative 
findings that the Supreme Court flatly rejected in Lopez.228 
Even the dissenters in Lopez found these factually-unsupported 
statements of Congressional purpose and conclusions unhelpful 
in their review of the statute.229 In light of the explicitness of 
this general disdain, giving the legislative findings of § 922(x) 
any weight is suspect.230 Affording them due deference, how-
ever, is even more questionable. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit failed to elaborate on its 
adoption of Congress' findings that gun violence affects inter-
state commerce, and referenced only its Mack decision.231 
Mack, however, is no more enlightening than Michael R. be-
cause the Ninth Circuit similarly adopted unsupported, gener-
alized findings of the same type rejected in Lopez.232 In addi-
tion, the question of whether gun violence affected interstate 
commerce was not raised as an issue in Mack.233 The Ninth 
Circuit's adoption of Congress' fmdings in Michael R. ignored 
the Lopez decision, which rejected conclusory legislative find-
ings and the "costs of crime" rationale.234 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly state it, the 
adoption of Congress' findings in Michael R. was consistent 
with the application of the rational basis standard ofreview.235 
In the pre-Lopez era, once the Supreme Court found a rational 
basis for Congress' decision to regulate an activity, the analysis 
was complete.236 Although the Lopez Court did not actually 
228. See id. The Court in Lopez refused to even consider the after-the-fact findings 
contained in § 922(q), as amended. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
229. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 612 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
230. See supra note 94. 
231. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345. 
232. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1028 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-344 reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.CAN. 1984). 
233. See Mack, 66 F.3d at 1028. 
234. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-64. 
235. See id. at 612-14 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter believed that "!Leg-
islative findings] may, in fact, have great value in telling courts what to look for, in 
establishing at least one frame of reference for review, and in citing to factual author-
ity." fd. at 614. 
236. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-304 (1964). 
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apply a rational-basis review, neither did it expressly reject 
that standard.237 Michael R. represents the Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation of Lopez as holding that a court should conduct 
an independent analysis into whether the activity is commer-
cial, but then defer to legislative expertise when determining a 
particular activity's effects on interstate commerce. 
In Michael R., the Ninth Circuit utilized language that im-
plicated the continued use of the deferential, rational-basis 
standard as part of the legal. structure the court used to find 
the law constitutional.238 The court stated it had "no doubt 
that possession of a handgun by a juvenile, as a general matter, 
could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. "239 The 
court did not state that the activity did have a substantial ef-
fect, only that it could have one. This statement indicates that 
the Ninth Circuit had no doubt that the legislature could have 
found that such an effect existed and that such a finding would 
have been rational. 
Thus, in Michael R., the Ninth Circuit added to the legal 
structure of Lopez by articulating the market regulation excep-
tion, while it retained the rational basis standard of review. 
The creation and application of this legal structure allowed the 
court to sustain a law that it viewed as beneficial, and not 
threatening, to the basic structure of federalism, even though, 
on its face, the law seemed equally as suspect as the law in Lo-
pez. 
C. THE FuTuRE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW 
Michael R. represents the inherent difficulty with judicial 
attempts to define the balance of federalism through review of 
Congressional actions under the Commerce Clause. In re-
viewing the use of the commerce power, the courts have, on the 
surface, concentrated on determining if Congress may regu-
late.24o Implicitly, however, to decide the proper extent of na-
237. See Althouse, supra note 6, at 799. 
238. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344-45. 
239. 1d. at 344. 
240. See Regan, supra note 1, at 560-62. 
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tional power under the framework of federalism, the question 
is should Congress regulate.241 The Supreme Court came clos-
est to asking the right question in Lopez. The Court, in effect, 
found that Congress should not regulate in the area of gun pos-
session and education because this would endanger federal-
ism.242 The Court reasoned, therefore, that although the com-
mercial activity test "may in some cases result in legal uncer-
tainty," the line between what is "truly national and truly lo-
cal" must be drawn somewhere.243 
Decisions regarding which problems require national action 
are the essence of the power given to Congress by Article I of 
the Constitution.244 Underlying the Court's decision to strike 
down the Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez was the Court's 
belief that Congress should not use the commerce power as a 
"general police power ofthe sort retained by the states."245 The 
fact that the Lopez Court did not articulate its position that 
Congress should not regulate gun possession near a school, 
and, instead, decided that Congress could not regulate this 
"noncommercial" activity, indicates that the Court is still un-
willing to admit that it is making policy decisions regarding 
how Congress should legislate. 
Lopez then, is best defined as an attempt by the Supreme 
Court to, as the saying goes, "keep Congress honest."246 When 
241. See id. at 557. 
242. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 567-68. 
243. [d.; see also Merritt, supra note 84, at 676 (describing Lopez as "a line drawn 
across the far reaches of the regulatory sand"). 
244. See supra, note 178. 
245. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
246. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A 
Theory of Commerce· Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 921, 922-23 (1997) ("A number of scholars, for example, explain the 
decision as merely a 'sort of "signalling device"- a reminder to Congress that the Court 
is still out there, willing (however reluctantly) to intervene if federal legislators become 
too complacent about extending their authority"') (quoting from Guns in Schools, 1995: 
Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., (1995) (statement of Professor Larry Kramer), available on WESTLAW, 1995 
WL 435712, (F.D.C.H.U.), at 26; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). Justice Kennedy wrote that: 
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to respect 
the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a part of 
our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing free-
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Congress makes no attempt to show the Court that, at a mini-
mum, it thought about the effects of its regulation on federal-
ism, the Court will treat the regulation as though Congress 
was threatening federalism itself, and the Court will find a way 
to strike down the law.247 On the other hand, Michael R. was 
an acknowledgment by the Ninth Circuit that when Congress 
has made some effort to explain why it chose to regulate an 
activity, the court will give great deference to Congress' deci-
sion.248 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lopez and Michael R. illustrate the problem created by the 
Supreme Court's attempt to protect federalism by defining the 
boundaries of the commerce power through formalistic analy-
sis.249 Whether the benefits of a certain law outweigh that 
law's tendency to lessen federalism's protection of diversity and 
experimentation, its protection against tyranny, its ability to 
increase political participation and accountability, or its distri-
bution of power in the most efficient manner, is essentially a 
political question. Thus, if the judicial branch chooses to re-
view the permissible extent of the commerce power, this review 
is necessarily composed of an implicit decision regarding 
whether Congress should act, and a court-created framework of 
legal theories that will allow the court to reach the decision it 
desires. 
This system of review is fatally flawed because it can always 
be manipulated by subsequent courts, or by Congress if it uses 
the "magic words" in its legislation.25o The Ninth Circuit's 
dom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of 
Government has tipped the scales too far. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
247. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. Chief Justice Rehnquist realized that the commer-
cial activity test "may in some cases result in legal uncertainty." Id. The Court, how-
ever, was willing to accept this uncertainty as the price for establishing some "judi-
cially enforceable outer limits" to the reach of the commerce power. Id. 
248. See Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345. 
249. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 960. 
250. See id. at 981-82. For a discussion of how Congress may rewrite a law to pass 
Lopez scrutiny, see Litman & Greenberg, supra note 246, detailing the post-Lopez 
changes to the Gun Free School Zones Act. 
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ability to distinguish Lopez in Michael R. presents additional 
proof of this flawed approach. In his dissent, Justice Souter 
described Lopez as either a "misstep" or an "epochal case."251 
In fact, it is neither.252 As Michael R. demonstrates, Lopez 
changed nothing fundamental in Commerce Clause review; 
rather it was directly in line with the same formalistic method 
the Supreme Court has previously employed.253 Truly signifi-
cant change in this area will come only if the Supreme Court 
admits that federalism is a policy, not a rule. The Court must 
then acknowledge that it is making policy decisions when it 
examines the Commerce Clause under its current system of 
review. Alternatively, the Court must remove itself from the 
decision making process altogether and allow Congress to de-
fine the policy of federalism, subject only to the limits of the 
political process itself. 
Since only two appellate court decisions, Michael R. and 
Cardoza, have addressed the issue thus far, it will probably be 
some time before the Supreme Court chooses to review the con-
stitutionality of § 922(x)(2).254 Where the Court takes Com-
251. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614-15 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
252. The majority of commentators have determined the Lopez did not mark the 
beginning of a new era of Commerce Clause review, for a wide variety of reasons. 
Chemerinsky found Lopez merely represented more judicial formalism. See Chemerin-
sky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 967. Merritt decided that the Lopez decision "rests 
on the confluence of almost a dozen factors making the case virtually unique." Merritt, 
supra note 84, at 692. According to Regan, Lopez's "distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial activities that affect commerce is an unsupported and ill-
considered gloss on an already misguided theory." Regan, supra note 1, at 555. Even 
those scholars who agree with the outcome of Lopez express doubt as to the decision's 
future impact. See Althouse, supra note 6, at 813 ("I sense that Lopez may amount to 
nothing more than a citation for the commercial/noncommercial distinction and the 
general proposition that the courts do have at least some role, however minimal, in 
limiting Congress to its enumerated powers ... "). One commentator, Calabresi, de-
scribed Lopez as an "extraordinary event" marking "a revolutionary and long overdue 
revival" of limiting federal powers. Calabresi, supra note 35, at 752. Calabresi none-
theless realized that it was likely Lopez will not change the practical outcome in future 
commerce power analysis. See id. at 831. 
253. See Chemerinsky, Formalism, supra note 38, at 961, 978. 
254. Since Michael R., there have been a number of other challenges to § 922(xX2) 
within the Ninth Circuit. These cases have the same title: United States v. Juvenile 
Male. The citations are: 120 F.3d 269 (9th Cir. 1997); ll6 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997); 107 
F.3d 18 (9th Cir. 1997) (two cases); and 98 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 1996) (three cases). In 
the last group of cases, the two requests for certiorari that were filed were denied. See 
ll7 S.Ct. 1010 (1997). In the unreported decisions of each of these post-Michael R. 
cases, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the challenge based entirely on the holding in 
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merce Clause review in the meantime is, of course, unknown. 
Given the lengthy history of Commerce Clause review and the 
Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to remove itself from the 
task of drawing federalism boundaries, no real change to the 
Court's approach is likely to occur in Michael R.'s lifetime. 
Steven Rosenberg* 
Miclwel R. In the First Circuit, the Court of Appeals recently affirmed the constitu-
tionality of 922(x)(2) in United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1997). See supra 
note 137. At the time of this writing, no other published opinion regarding the consti-
tutionality of § 922(x)(2) had been recorded. 
• Golden Gate University Class of 1999. This article is dedicated to the memory of 
David Jeffreys, an incredible friend and human being. I thank my editors, Julie Coldi-
cotto Laurel Vreeland and Susan Lee, as well as my faculty advisors, Roberta Simon 
and Marc Stickgold. Thanks also to all the others who have helped with the writing of 
this article. Of course, extra special thanks to my wife, Susan Rattenbury, for her 
nearly unwavering patience and support during the writing of this article and the rest 
of my law school career. 
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